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In majority of protocols of secure quantum communication (such as, BB84, B92, etc.),
the unconditional security of the protocols are obtained by using conjugate coding (two
or more mutually unbiased bases). Initially all the conjugate-coding-based protocols of
secure quantum communication were restricted to quantum key distribution (QKD), but
later on they were extended to other cryptographic tasks (such as, secure direct quantum
communication and quantum key agreement). In contrast to the conjugate-coding-based
protocols, a few completely orthogonal-state-based protocols of unconditionally secure
QKD (such as, Goldenberg-Vaidman (GV) and N09) were also proposed. However, till
the recent past orthogonal-state-based protocols were only a theoretical concept and
were limited to QKD. Only recently, orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKD are ex-
perimentally realized and extended to cryptographic tasks beyond QKD. This paper
aims to briefly review the orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum commu-
nication that are recently introduced by our group and other researchers.
Keywords: quantum communication using orthogonal states; DSQC; QSDC; QKD; quan-
tum cryptography.
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1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography is now 30 years old as it was first introduced in 1984 when
Bennett and Brassard 1 proposed the first protocol of quantum key distribution
(QKD) which is now known as BB84 protocol. This pioneering work drew con-
siderable attention of the entire cryptography community as it was successful in
achieving unconditional security, a much desirable feat that is never achievable in
the classical cryptography. To be precise, all the classical cryptographic protocols
including the widely used RSA protocol are secure only under some assumptions,
whereas quantum cryptographic protocols are unconditionally secure. Due to this
existing feature of QKD, Bennett and Brassard’s initial proposal was followed by a
large number of alternate protocols of QKD 2,3,4. The applicability of early protocols
of quantum cryptography 1,2,3,4 were limited to QKD. However, it was soon real-
ized that quantum states can be employed for other cryptographic tasks, too. For
example, quantum states can be used for quantum secret sharing (QSS) of classical
secrets 5, deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC) 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) 14,15,16,17, quantum dialogue 18,19,
quantum key agreement (Ref. 20 and references therein), etc. Reviews on these
topics, present challenges and future prospects of secure quantum communication
can be found in Refs. 21,22,23,24.
The unconditional security of the existing protocols are usually claimed to be
obtained using different approaches and different quantum resources like, single
particle states 1,3,15,17,25, entangled state 2, teleportation 8, entanglement swapping
9, rearrangement of order of particles 11,26, etc. Although these protocols differ with
each other with respect to the procedure followed and the quantum resources used,
the security of all these protocols of secure quantum communication essentially
arises from the use of conjugate coding (i.e., from the quantum non-commutativity
or equivalently from the use of two or more mutually unbiased bases (MUBs))
as in all these protocols the existence of an eavesdropper is traced by measuring
verification qubits in 2 or more MUBs. Thus all these protocols may be viewed as
conjugate-coding-based protocols of quantum communication, alternatively these
protocols may be referred to as BB84-type protocols of quantum communication.
The existence of such a large number of conjugate-coding-based protocols of
quantum communication leads to a fundamental question: Is conjugate coding es-
sential for unconditionally secure quantum communication? The answer is “no”.
Specifically, it is possible to design protocols of secure quantum communication
using orthogonal states alone. Thus we can design protocols of secure quantum
communication using orthogonal states for encoding of information, decoding of
information and eavesdropping check i.e., using a single basis for implementation of
the entire protocol without involving any use of two or more MUBs or conjugate cod-
ing. First such orthogonal-state-based protocol was reported in 1995 by Goldenberg
and Vaidman 4 and subsequently a few other orthogonal-state-based protocols of
QKD were reported 27,28,29. However, till recent past activities on orthogonal-state
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based protocols of quantum communication were limited to QKD and theoretical
studies alone. Only recently a set of exciting experiments on orthogonal-state-based
protocols of quantum communication have been reported 30,31,32,33. Further, new
orthogonal-state-based protocols are proposed for quantum cryptographic tasks be-
yond QKD 20,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44. These orthogonal-state-based proposals
can be broadly classified in two classes: (i) GV-type protocols which are analo-
gous to the original GV-protocol and in which transmission of qubits that carry
secret information through the quantum channel is allowed, but the information is
protected from the eavesdropping by geographically separating an orthogonal state
into two or more quantum pieces that are not simultaneously accessible to Eve and
(ii) N09-type protocols or counterfactual protocols that use interaction free mea-
surement and circumvents the transmission of information carrying qubits through
the quantum channel. GV-type protocols are mostly investigated by the present
authors and their collaborators 20,23,34,35,36. Specifically, we have shown that it is
feasible to construct orthogonal-state-based protocols of QKA 20, QSDC and DSQC
34,35,36. Practically, we have established that all the secure quantum communica-
tion tasks that can be performed using two or more MUBs can also be achieved
by using single basis. Similarly, much progress has recently been made in designing
of counterfactual (i.e., N09-type) protocols. For example, in 2013, Salih et al. have
claimed to design a counterfactual protocol of direct quantum communication 37.
The claim was subsequently criticized by Vaidman 45 and the criticism lead to a very
interesting debate on the issue 46. Further, recently Salih has also proposed counter-
factual protocols for transportation of an unknown qubit 41 and tripartite quantum
cryptography 44, Guo et al. have proposed protocol of counterfactual entanglement
distribution 42, Guo et al. proposed protocol of counterfactual information transfer
39, Sun and Wen have proposed a modified N09 protocol 38 which is more efficient
than the actual N09 protocol and some of the present authors proposed proto-
cols of counterfactual certificate authentication 40 and semi-counterfactual QKD
47. These exciting developments of recent past motivated us to briefly review these
recent achievements with specific attention to works of our group.
Here we will briefly review a set of existing orthogonal-state-based protocols and
describe a trick that helps us to transform BB84-type protocols into Goldenberg-
Vaidman (GV) type 4 protocols, which uses only orthogonal states for encoding,
decoding and error checking, as was done in the original GV protocol of QKD. Sub-
sequently, we will describe two orthogonal-state-based protocols of quantum com-
munication introduced by us and briefly describe how they can be extended. These
two orthogonal-state-based protocols are fundamentally different from conjugate-
coding-based (BB84-type) protocols as their security does not depend on noncom-
mutativity. Consequently, they are very important from the foundational perspec-
tive.
The trick that can transform BB84-type protocols into GV-type protocol re-
quires the rearrangement of orders of particles or permutation of particles (PoP).
As PoP plays a very crucial role in our protocol, it would be apt to note that this
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technique was first introduced by Deng and Long in 2003, while they proposed a
protocol of QKD based on this technique 48. Subsequently, a DSQC protocol based
on the rearrangement of orders of particles was proposed by Zhu et al. 11 in 2006.
However, it was shown to be insecure under a Trojan-horse attack by Li et al. 7. In
Ref. 7, Li et al. had also provided an improved version of Zhu et al. protocol that
is free from the above mentioned Trojan-horse attack. Thus we may consider Li
et al. protocol as the first unconditionally secure protocol of DSQC based on PoP.
Recently, many PoP based protocols are proposed (See 23 and references therein).
Specifically, many such PoP-based protocols of quantum communication have been
proposed in recent past. For example, Banerjee and Pathak 49, Shukla, Banerjee
and Pathak 50, Yuan et al. 13 and Tsai et al. 26 have recently proposed PoP-based
protocols of direct secure quantum communication. In what follows, we will see that
PoP provides us a useful tool for the generalization of the original GV protocol into
corresponding multipartite version.
The remaining part of the present paper is organized as follows, in Section 2, we
briefly review the development of orthogonal-state-based secure quantum communi-
cation until now by providing a chronological history of developments of protocols of
orthogonal-state-based secure quantum communication and their experimental ver-
ifications. In Section 3, we discuss the role of no-cloning and randomness in secure
communication and with some specific examples show that it is possible to trans-
form all BB84-type protocols of secure quantum communication to corresponding
GV-type protocols. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 4.
2. A chronological history of protocols of orthogonal-state-based
secure quantum communication and their experimental
verification
1995: All the protocols of quantum cryptography proposed until 1995 were based
on nonorthogonal states and security of those protocols arose directly or
indirectly through noncommutativity, but in 1995, Goldenberg and Vaid-
man 4 proposed a completely orthogonal-state-based protocol of QKD,
where the security arises due to duality (for single particle). This was the
birth of orthogonal-state-based protocol of quantum cryptography. Inter-
estingly, the fact that GV protocol is fundamentally different from the
BB84-type protocol was questioned by Peres 51. However, Goldenberg and
Vaidman successfully defended their work 52 and established the fact that
this orthogonal-state-based protocol is fundamentally different from the
conventional BB84-type protocol. In the next section we have briefly de-
scribed this protocol and have shown that the protocol uses a slightly mod-
ified Mach-Zehnder interferometer (See Fig. 1a ).
1997: Koashi and Imoto 29 generalized the GV protocol and proposed a protocol
similar to GV protocol, but does not require random sending time.
1998: Mor 53 showed that it is not always possible to clone orthogonal states.
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Specifically, an orthogonal state cannot be cloned if the full state cannot
be accessed at the same time. Using this idea, Mor provided a clear and
innovative explanation of the origin of security of GV protocol.
1999: Four years after the introduction of first orthogonal-state-based QKD pro-
tocol (i.e., GV protocol), Guo and Shi 28 proposed the second orthogonal-
state-based protocol of QKD using the concept of interaction-free measure-
ment or quantum interrogation 54, an idea that was introduced earlier by
Elitzur and Vaidman in context of a very interesting hypothetical situa-
tion in which some of the active bombs can be separated from the inactive
ones without directly observing the active bombs (i.e., without sending any
photon to the isolated active bombs which blasts when receives a photon,
whereas inactive bombs does not show any response on receiving a pho-
ton). Actually, the bombs are placed in the lower arm of a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer and a single photon is sent through the input port (See Fig.
1b). With 50% probability the single photon travels through the upper arm
of the interferometer. Even in these 50% cases, if we have an active bomb
(thus a detector) in the lower arm, the interference is destroyed as we ob-
tain the which path information, and consequently in half of these incidents
(i.e., 25% of the total) the detector present at the output port of the inter-
ferometer that does not click in absence of any detector in the lower arm
would click. As a consequence we will be able to detect 25% of the active
bombs without blasting them. Thus, in brief, the presence of the obstacle
(active bomb) disrupts the destructive interference that would otherwise
occur and thereby reveal its presence. Guo and Shi modified the idea and
in their protocol Alice (Bob) randomly inserts an absorber in upper (lower)
arm of the interferometer (See Fig. 1c). Form the clicks of the upper de-
tector which does not click in absence of the detector, Bob knows that one
of the absorber was present in one of the arm. In these cases he discloses
that his upper detector has been clicked. As Alice (Bob) knows whether she
(he) has inserted the absorber, using the observation of Bob she (he) can
conclude whether Bob (Alice) has inserted the absorber or not and subse-
quently use this to form a key using a pre-decided rule: presence of Alice’s
(Bob’s) absorber implies bit value 0 (1). Anyway, Guo and Shi’s effort was
the first step towards orthogonal-state-based counterfactual QKD and in
recent years interaction-free measurement is frequently used as a tool for
the designing of counterfactual quantum cryptographic protocols.
2009: A protocol of counterfactual QKD (orthogonal-state-based) was proposed
by Noh in 2009 27 using the Elitzur and Vaidman’s idea of interaction-free
measurement. This protocol of QKD is now known as N09 protocol or coun-
terfactual protocol. This protocol led to many subsequent counterfactual
protocols of secure quantum communication. The beauty of this proto-
col and other counterfactual protocols is that a secure key is distributed
(or other cryptographic task is achieved) without transmitting a particle
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that carries secret information through the quantum channel. Interestingly,
in GV, Koashi-Imoto and Guo-Shi protocols Mach-Zehnder interferometer
was used, but in this protocol a Michelson interferometer is used (See Fig.
1d)a.
2010: Sun and Wen 38 improved the original N09 protocol by providing analogous
counterfactual protocol with higher frequency. In the same year, Avella et
al. experimentally implemented GV protocol 30. To the best of our knowl-
edge this was the first ever experimental demonstration of orthogonal-state-
based protocol of QKD.
2011: Experimental realization of N09 protocol was reported shortly after realiza-
tion of GV protocol. Precisely, in 2011, Ren et al. reported experimental
realization of N09 protocol 31.
2012: Soon after Ren et al.’s work two more groups reported experimental re-
alization of N09 protocol. Specifically, Brida et al. 32 and Liu et al. 33,
independently implemented this protocol of counterfactual quantum com-
munication. In theoretical front, some of the present authors generalized
the single particle GV protocol to multipartite case 35 and showed that GV-
type protocol can be used for secure direct communication and established
that while in GV the encoding states are perfectly indistinguishable, in the
bi-partite case, they are partially distinguishable, leading to a qualitatively
different kind of information-vs-disturbance trade-off and also options for
Eve in the two cases. Further, generalizing the idea we had also established
that GV-type protocol of DSQC, QSDC and QKD can be realized using
arbitrary quantum states 34. Essential ideas that lead to these multipartite
GV-type protocols will be explained briefly in the next section.
2013: While the above counterfactual protocols are probabilistic, H. Salih et al.
proposed a protocol for counterfactual direct quantum communication 37.
This work of Salih et al., led to an interesting debate and whether the proto-
col is counterfactual for only one of the two bit values has been controversial
45. This protocol efficiently uses chained quantum Zeno effect and an ar-
rangement of sequence of Mach-Zehnder interferometers, where each of the
Mach-Zehnder interferometer essentially uses Elitzur and Vaidman setup
for interaction free measurement. In the same year, Zhang et al. proposed
a counterfactual protocol of private database queries 43 which also uses a
similar setup of sequence of Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Further, the ap-
plicability of GV-type orthogonal-state-based protocols of secure quantum
communication was extended by some of the present authors to quantum
key agreement (QKA) where Alice and Bob contribute equally to the final
shared key and none of them can control the final key 20.
a
Interested readers may refer to Refs. 24,30 for detail description of the setup.
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2014: 2014 is the most active year in the history of orthogonal-state-based secure
quantum communication. In this year many interesting results appeared.
Here we list a few of them: (i) Guo et al. proposed a protocol of counter-
factual quantum-information transfer 39, (ii) Guo et al. proposed a coun-
terfactual protocol of entanglement distribution 42, (iii) Salih proposed a
multiparty (tripartite) scheme of counterfactual quantum communication
44 and (iv) some of the present authors proposed a scheme for counterfac-
tual quantum certificate authorization 40.
In the above chronological review we have seen that majority of the interesting
developments in orthogonal-state-based secure quantum communication happened
in last few years. The development is expected to continue and it is expected to
play important role in practical realization of secure quantum communication and
also in our understanding of quantum mechanics in general and origin of security in
quantum mechanics and post-quantum theories in particular. Keeping these facts in
mind, in the next section we briefly review role of no-cloning theorem in realization
of orthogonal-state-based protocols and also briefly describe a few orthogonal-state-
based GV-type protocols of secure quantum communication.
3. Role of no-cloning and randomness in secure communication
and how to transform BB84-type protocols to GV-type
protocols
It is well known that unknown quantum states cannot be cloned and several proofs
of no-cloning theorem are provided using unitary evolution 53, no-signaling 55, lin-
earity 56. A closer look into these proofs reveals that there exist fine differences
among these proofs and those differences lead to a fundamental question: What
nonclassical resources are required for the existence of no-cloning theorem in a the-
ory T . Recently, we have shown that no-cloning theorem should hold in any theory
possessing uncertainty and disturbance on measurement 57. Thus we can construct
post-quantum theories with no-cloning. Without going into detail of those theories,
let us try to follow a simpler argument that can give us a general perception of no-
cloning theorem. To begin with let us try to address another simple question: What
distinguishes a completely stochastic classical theory from the quantum mechanics?
Clearly, in a completely stochastic classical theory the outcomes of measurement
are always probabilistic whereas in quantum mechanics we can have a deterministic
outcome if the state to be measured is part of the basis set used for the measure-
ment. For example, if we measure |0〉 in {|0〉, |1〉} basis we will always get |0〉 (thus
the outcome is deterministic as the state is part of the basis), but if we measure
|0〉 in {|+〉, |−〉} basis we will have probabilistic outcome. We may say that the
{|0〉, |1〉} basis is special basis as it leads to deterministic outcome. We may now
generalize the idea and say that for measurement of a state a particular basis set will
be referred to as special basis if the state can be perfectly measured in that basis. It
is easy to recognize that existence of special basis implies perfect measurement and
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thus complete information of the state being measured. This information implies
that the state is known and thus can be cloned. In contrast, absence of special basis
implies no-cloning. As the elements of any basis set are orthogonal to each other,
two nonorthogonal states cannot be part of the same basis set and thus cannot be
cloned. However, this viewpoint does not demand that the orthogonal states can
always be cloned. Specifically, by using geographical separation among the compo-
nents of a superposition state we can make it non-clonable. In a completely different
language this viewpoint was elaborated by Mor 53 in 1998. Of course Mor’s work
appeared after the GV protocol, but it helped us to understand and generalize GV
protocol. Let us elaborate this point by briefly describing GV protocol.
3.1. Goldenberg-Vaidman (GV) protocol
Let us consider two orthogonal states
|ψ0〉 = 1√2 (|a〉+ |b〉) (1)
Fig. 1. (a) A schematic diagram of a modified Mach-Zehnder interferometer that can be used
to implement GV protocol [4] if the symmetric beam spliters used as 50:50, otherwise (i.e., if the
symmetric beam splitters are not 50:50) the same device implements Koashi-Imoto protocol [29].
Here SRi denotes a delay. (b) A schematic diagram of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer that can
be used to implement Elitzur and Vaidman’s idea of interaction-free measurement or quantum
interrogation [54]. Here the absorber is an active bomb that blasts when receives a photon. (c) A
schematic diagram of Mach-Zehnder interferometer that can be used to realize orthogonal-state-
based protocol of Guo-Shi [28] which uses interaction-free measurement. Here O1 and O2 are the
obstacles that are randomly inserted by Alice and Bob, respectively. (d) A schematic diagram of
the experimental setup used in Refs. [24. 32] to implement N09 protocol [27] of counterfactual
QKD. In all the diagrams BS, M, C, PBS, HWP, D and OD represent beam splitter, mirror,
circulator, polarizing beam splitter, half wave plate, detector and optical delay, respectively.
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and
|ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|a〉 − |b〉) , (2)
where |a〉 and |b〉 are two localized wave packets. Further, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 represent
bit values 0 and 1, respectively. Alice sends wave packets |a〉 and |b〉 to Bob by
using two different arms of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer as shown in the Fig.
1 a. Alice sends Bob either |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉, but |a〉 is always sent first and |b〉 is
delayed by time τ . Here traveling time (θ) of wave packets from Alice to Bob
is shorter than τ . Thus |b〉 enters the communication channel only after |a〉 is
received by Bob. Consequently, both the wave packets |a〉 and |b〉 (i.e., the entire
superposition) are never found simultaneously in the transmission channel. This
geographic separation between |a〉 and |b〉 restricts Eve from measuring the state
communicated by Alice in {|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉} basis. In fact, this geographic separation
method compels Eve to measure the state communicated by Alice either in {|a〉, |b〉}
basis or in some suitably constructed positive-operator valued measure (POVM).
Thus the geographic separation ensures unavailability of special basis and thus
implies no-cloning and security of GV protocol. This is how one can look at the
security of GV protocol using the concept of special basis or the idea of Mor 53.
Although the special basis is not available to Eve, it is available to Bob as Bob
delays |a〉 by τ and recreates the superposition state sent by Alice after he receives
|b〉 (cf. Fig. 1 a). In order to restrict Eve to perform the similar operation (i.e., to
delay |a〉 till the arrival of |b〉) Alice and Bob need to perform following tests:
(1) Alice and Bob compare the receiving time tr with the sending time ts for each
state to ensure that Eve cannot delay |a〉 and wait for |b〉 to reach her so that
she can do a measurement in {|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉}. Specifically, Alice and Bob checks
that tr = ts + θ + τ.
This test ensures that Eve cannot delay a wave packet, but it does not stop her
from replacing a wave packet by a fake wave packet. The following test detects
such an attack.
(2) Alice and Bob look for changes in the data by comparing a portion of the
transmitted bits with the same portion of the received bits.
It is important to note that sending time in GV protocol must be random. Oth-
erwise, Eve can prepare a fake state in |ψ0〉 and send the fake |a〉 to Bob at the
known arrival time. Eve can keep the original |a〉 and the fake |b〉 wave packets
with her till the arrival of original |b〉. When |b〉 arrives then she measures the orig-
inal state. If the measurement yields |ψ0〉 then she sends the fake wave packet |b〉
to Bob. Otherwise, she corrects the phase of the fake wave packet and sends −|b〉
to Bob. If we assume that the time required for Eve’s measurement is negligible,
then following this procedure Eve can obtain the key without being detected. In-
terestingly, this requirement of random sending time can be circumvented just by
replacing the 50:50 beam spliters present in the GV setup (cf. Fig. 1 a ) by identical
beam splitters having R 6= T , where R and T are reflectivity and transmissivity,
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respectively. This small change in GV setup ( 1 a) turns it into Koashi-Imoto 29
protocol.
In the above we have already seen that it is possible to separate two pieces
of orthogonal state and that leads to unavailability of special basis and thus no-
cloning and orthogonal-state-based QKD. In what follows we will show that validity
of GV-type protocol is not limited to single particle case and QKD, it can be
easily generalized to multipartite case and to design protocols of DSQC and QSDC.
Before we describe an orthogonal-state-based protocol of secure direct quantum
communication, we wish to note that GV in its original form is a protocol of QKD
only and it cannot be directly used for secure direct quantum communication.
Keeping this in mind, let us first describe a conjugate coding based protocol of
secure direct quantum communication. The protocol is popularly known as ping-
pong (PP) protocol 15 and is described in the following section.
3.2. Ping-pong and modified ping-pong protocols
Ping-pong (PP) protocol which was introduced by Bostro¨m and Felbinger in 2002
15 is a protocol of QSDC and it may be described briefly as follows 23:
PP1 Bob prepares n copies of the Bell state |ψ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)AB (i.e.,
|ψ+〉⊗n), and transmits all the first qubits of the Bell pairs to Alice, keeping
all the second particles with himself.
PP2 Alice randomly selects a set of n2 qubits from the string received by her as a
verification string, and applies the BB84 subroutineb on the verification string
to detect eavesdropping. If sufficiently few errors are found, they proceed to the
next step; else, they return to the previous step.
PP3 Alice randomly selects half of the unmeasured qubits as verification string
for the return path and encodes her message in the remaining n4 qubits using
following rule: Alice does nothing to encode 0 on a message qubit, and applies
an X gate to encode 1. After completion of the encoding operation, she sends
all the n2 qubits of her possession to Bob.
PP4 Alice discloses the coordinates of the verification qubits after receiving au-
thenticated acknowledgment of receipt of all the qubits from Bob. Bob applies
the BB84 subroutine on the verification qubits and computes the error rate. If
sufficiently few errors are found, they proceed to the next step; else, they return
to PP1.
bBB84 subroutine means eavesdropping is checked by following a procedure similar to that adopted
in the original BB84 protocol. Specifically, BB84 subroutine implies that Alice (Bob) randomly
selects half of the qubits received by her (him) to form a verification string. She (He) measures
verification qubits randomly in {0, 1} or {+,−} basis and announces the measurement outcome,
position of that qubit in the string and the basis used for the particular measurement. Bob (Alice)
also measures the corresponding qubit using the same basis (if needed) and compares his (her)
results with the announced result of Alice (Bob) to detect eavesdropping.
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PP5 Bob performs Bell-state measurements on the remaining Bell pairs, and de-
codes the message.
If in PP3 Alice has encoded 0 then Bob will obtain |ψ+〉 (the same as he had
sent) in PP5, otherwise he will receive |φ+〉. Since |ψ+〉 and |φ+〉 are orthogonal a
Bell measurement will deterministically distinguish |ψ+〉 and |φ+〉 and consequently
decode the message encrypted by Alice. This two-way protocol is referred to as the
ping-pong protocol as the travel qubit moves from Bob to Alice and comes back just
like a table tennis (ping-pong) ball which moves back and forth between two sides
of the table. It is easy to observe that in the original PP protocol full power of dense
coding is not used. Alice could have used I, X, iY and Z to encode 00, 01, 10 and
11 respectively and that would have increased the efficiency of ping-pong protocol.
This is so because the same amount of communication would have successfully
carried two bits of classical information. This fact was first formally included in a
modified PP protocol proposed by Cai and Li in 2004 25. In fact, in principle any
entangled state can be used to design a ping-pong type protocol for QSDC.
Here it is interesting to observe that in the above version of PP protocol (and
in CL protocol) encoding and decoding of information is done by using orthogonal
states alone. However, the eavesdropping checking is done with the help of BB84
subroutine. Thus to convert PP protocol into an orthogonal-state-based protocol
we would require to replace BB84 subroutine by a GV-type subroutine for eaves-
dropping check. While describing the role of special basis on the origin of security
of GV protocol, we have already mentioned that if we can visualize an orthogonal
state as superposition of two quantum pieces that are geographically separable then
the orthogonal state can be transmitted in such a way that Eve can neither clone
it nor measure it without disturbing. In addition, we may note that an entangled
state is a superposition in tensor product space. Now just consider a simple situ-
ation that Alice prepares a product of two Bell states say |ψ+〉⊗2 = |ψ+ψ+〉1234
and randomly changes the sequence of the particles and sends them to Bob over
a channel. Now Eve knows that two Bell states are sent and she has to do a Bell
measurement to know which Bell state is sent, but she does not know which particle
is entangled to which particle. Consequently, any wrong choice of partner particles
would lead to entanglement swapping (say if Eve does Bell measurement on 13
and/or 24 that would lead to entanglement swapping). Now consider that at a later
time, when Bob informs Alice that he has received 4 qubits then Alice discloses
the actual sequence of the transmitted qubits and Bob uses that data to rearrange
the qubits in his hand into the original sequence and perform Bell measurement
on them. Clearly, attempts of eavesdropping will leave detectable traces through
the entanglement swapping and whenever Bob’s Bell measurement would yield any
result other than |ψ+〉 they will know there exists a Eve. Clearly, this new eaves-
dropping checking subroutine is of GV-type as it uses orthogonal states only and
as it geographically separates two quantum pieces of an orthogonal state. Further,
PoP technique applied here actually ensures that the special basis (Bell basis in
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this case) is not available with Eve when the particles are in the channel, but after
Alice’s disclosure of the actual sequence of the qubit, Bob obtains access to the
special basis. Once we understand the essence of this strategy, we may generalize
it to develop a GV-type subroutine as follows:
(1) To communicate a sequence A of n message qubits, Alice creates an additional
sequence D of n decoy qubits prepared as |ψ⊗n2 〉.
(2) She concatenates D with A to obtain a new sequence P of 2n qubits and applies
a permutation operator Π2n on P to yield P
′ = Π2nP.
(3) After receiving authenticated acknowledgment from Bob that he has received
all the 2n qubits sent to him, Alice discloses the actual sequence of the decoy
qubits only (she does not disclose the sequence of message qubits) so that Bob
can perform Bell measurement on partner particles (original Bell pairs) and
reveal any effort of eavesdropping through the disturbance introduced by Eve’s
measurements.
As the message qubits are also randomized and as Alice does not disclose the actual
sequence till she knows that eavesdropping has not happened. Above subroutine
for eavesdropping checking which we referred to as GV subroutine can be used
to convert any BB84-type protocol of secure quantum communication that utilizes
orthogonal states for encoding and decoding. For example, PP 15, Cai-Li 25 and DLL
58 protocol can be converted easily into GV-type protocol. This idea is extensively
discussed in our recent publications 20,34,35,36. For the completeness of the present
paper we elaborate this point here by explicitly describing a GV-type version of
PP protocol which we referred to as PPGV. More detail about this protocol can be
found at Refs. 23,35.
3.3. PPGV protocol
In what follows we briefly describe the PPGV protocol introduced by Yadav,
Srikanth and Pathak 35. We can convert PP protocol to PPGV protocol by modi-
fying steps PP1, PP2 and PP4 of PP protocol described above as follows:
PPGV1 Bob prepares the state |ψ+〉⊗n. He keeps half of the second qubits of
the Bell pairs with himself. On the remaining 3n2 qubits he applies a random
permutation operation Π 3n
2
and transmits them to Alice. n of the transmitted
qubits are Bell pairs and the remaining n2 are the partner particles of the
particles which remained with Bob.
PPGV2 After receiving Alice’s authenticated acknowledgment, Bob announces
Πn ∈ Π 3n
2
, the coordinates of the transmitted Bell pairs. Alice measures them
in the Bell basis to determine if they are each in the state |ψ+〉. If the error
detected by Alice is within the tolerable limit, they continue to the next step.
Otherwise, they discard the protocol and restart from PPGV1.
PPGV4 Alice discloses the coordinates of the verification qubits after receiving
Bob’s authenticated acknowledgment of receipt of all the qubits. Bob combines
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the qubits of verification string with their partner particles already in his pos-
session and measures them in the Bell basis to compute the (return trip) error
rate.
The other steps in PP remain the same.
Briefly, security in PPGV and CLGV arises as follows. The reordering has the
same effect as time control and time randomization in GV. Eve is unable to apply a
2-qubit operation on legitimate partner particles to determine the encoding in spite
of their orthogonality. Any correlation she generates by interacting with individual
particles will diminish the observed correlations between Alice and Bob because
of restrictions on shareability of quantum correlations 35. It is not our purpose to
discuss the security of the protocol in detail here. Interested readers may found
detailed discussions on the security of PPGV in Refs. 34,35. The PPGV protocol of
Yadav, Srikanth and Pathak was the first ever orthogonal-state-based protocol of
QSDC.
PP protocol described above is a two way protocol in the sense that the qubits
travel in both the direction (i.e., from Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice). However,
it is possible to modify them into one-way protocols. A very interesting one-way
protocol known as DLL protocol was introduced by Deng, Long and Liu in 2003
58. This protocol can be obtained by modifying CL protocol. In what follows we
will describe DLL protocol and subsequently modify that to a GV-type protocol
which we refer to as DLLGV. A relatively detailed description of this protocol can
be found at Ref. 23.
Before we describe DLL protocol we may note that after PP1, Alice and Bob
share entanglement. To share an entanglement it is not required to be created by
Bob as in PP protocol, even Alice can create an entangled state and send a qubit
to Bob. Let us modify the first step of PP protocol and see what happens.
3.4. DLL protocol
DLL1 Alice prepares the state |ψ+〉⊗n, where |ψ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)AB , and
transmits all the second qubits (say B) of the Bell pairs to Bob, keeping the
other half (A) with herself.
DLL2 Bob randomly chooses a set of n2 qubits from the string received by him to
form a verification string, on which the BB84 subroutine to detect eavesdrop-
ping is applied. If sufficiently few errors are found, they proceed to the next
step; else, they return to DLL1.
DLL3 Alice randomly chooses half of the qubits in her possession to form the ver-
ification string for the next round of communication, and encodes her message
in the remaining n4 qubits. To encode a 2-bit key message, Alice applies one
of the four Pauli operations I,X, iY, Z on her qubits. Specifically, to encode
00, 01, 10 and 11 she applies I,X, iY and Z, respectively. After the encoding
operation, Alice sends all the qubits in her possession to Bob.
DLL4 Alice discloses the coordinates of the verification qubits after receiving au-
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thenticated acknowledgment of receipt of all the qubits from Bob. Bob applies
a BB84 subroutine to the verification string and computes the error rate.
DLL5 If the error rate is tolerably low, then Bob decodes the encoded states via
a Bell-state measurement on the remaining Bell pairs.
DLL protocol described in this way helps us to illustrate the symmetry among PP,
CL and DLL protocols. This is a one-way two-step QSDC protocol. DLL protocol
looks similar to PP protocol with dense coding (i.e., CL protocol). However, there is
a fundamental difference between a two-way protocol and a two-step one-way pro-
tocol which uses the same resources and encoding operations. The difference lies in
the fact that in a two-way protocol home qubit always remains at sender’s port but
in a one-way two-step protocol both the qubits travel through the channel. At this
specific point we observe a symmetry between DLL protocol and GV protocol. Here
the superposition is broken into two pieces in such a way that the entire superposed
(entangled) state is never available in the transmission channel but only the entire
superposition (i.e., the superposed state or entangled state) contains meaningful
information. Visualization of this intrinsic symmetry helps us to generalize DLL
protocol to obtain an orthogonal version of GV protocol.
3.4.1. The modified DLL protocol (DLLGV)
Based on the reasoning analogous to the one used for turning PP to PPGV, we
may propose the following GV-like version of DLL, which may be called DLLGV in
accordance with the recent work of Yadav, Srikanth and Pathak 35. As before, we
retain the steps of DLL, replacing only steps DLL1, DLL2 and DLL4 as follows
23,35:
DLLGV1 Alice prepares the state |ψ+〉⊗n. She keeps half of the first qubits of
the Bell pairs with herself. On the remaining 3n2 qubits she applies a random
permutation operation Π 3n
2
and transmits them to Bob; n of the transmitted
qubits are Bell pairs while the remaining n2 are the entangled partners of the
particles remaining with Alice.
DLLGV2 After receiving Bob’s authenticated acknowledgment, Alice announces
Πn ∈ Π 3n
2
, the coordinates of the transmitted Bell pairs. Bob measures them
in the Bell basis to determine if they are each in the state |ψ+〉. If the error
detected by Bob is within a tolerable limit, they continue to the next step.
Otherwise, they discard the protocol and restart from DLLGV1.
DLLGV4 Same as PPGV4, except that the ’return trip’ is replaced by Alice’s
second onward communication.
So two-way protocols of QSDC are now converted to one-way protocols. But still
we need two steps. This motivates us to ask: Do we always need at least two
steps for secure direct quantum communications? Apparently it looks so because
if we send both the qubits of an entangled pair together then Eve may perform
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Bell measurement and find out the message. Even if Eve is detected afterward it
would not be of any use because she has already obtained the message. However,
using rearrangement of particle order (PoP) we can restrict Eve from measuring
in Bell (special) basis and circumvent this problem. We have already used PoP in
implementing PPGV, CLGV and DLLGV. Using PoP a one-step one-way protocol
of DSQC is already provided by us in Ref. 34. However, due to space restriction we
do not elaborate the one-step one-way orthogonal-state-based protocol here.
We end-up this section by drawing your attention to the fact that in all the
existing protocols information splitting is done in such a way that Eve does not
get access to the special basis. Thus unavailability of special basis leads to no-
cloning and thus to secure quantum communication and in the above described
orthogonal-state-based protocol we have primarily ensured unavailability of special
basis by geographically separating a quantum state into two pieces and avoiding
Eve’s simultaneous access to both the pieces.
4. Conclusions
In the present work we have briefly reviewed the recent developments on orthogonal-
state-based protocols of secure quantum communication. We have classified the
recently proposed orthogonal-state-based protocols into two sub-classes: GV-type
and Counterfactual. GV-type protocols are discussed with relatively more detail
and it is explicitly shown that by using a GV-type subroutine where Bell states
are used as decoy qubits we can convert any conjugate coding based protocol with
orthogonal-state-based encoding and decoding into GV-type completely orthogonal-
state-based protocol. Thus in principle, every task that can be done using conjugate
coding can also be done using orthogonal states alone. As examples, we have ex-
plicitly shown here how PP and DLL protocols can be converted to corresponding
GV-type protocols. Further, since earlier proposals of orthogonal-state-based pro-
tocols are experimentally implemented recently, we may hope that ideas presented
in this work and our more detailed related works 20,34,35,36 will be implemented
soon and this type of protocols would draw much more attention of cryptography
community because of their fundamentally different nature.
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